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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

We publish this month the much discussed decision of the United States
supreme court relative to taxing income arising from sale of capital assets.
The subject matter of this decision and the conclusions are of first import
ance to accountants. This fact has been borne in upon us by the number
of requests that have been received by this department to furnish the full
text of the decision.
The conclusions of the court are in accordance with best accounting prin
ciples and thought, and, like the decision respecting stock dividends, are
received with much satisfaction by the accountancy profession.
This issue also contains a number of treasury decisions that should
interest the readers of The Journal of Accountancy, among which we
wish to single out No. 3159. This decision deals with a question that is
met frequently by accountants.
In the case cited, a receiver of a railroad received in 1918 a lump sum
as extra compensation for his services rendered over a period of five years.
It had been his habit to make his income-tax return on a cash-receiptsand-disbursements basis, but upon receiving the lump sum aforementioned
he sought to make amended returns for the years of his service upon the
theory that a pro rata share of the extra compensation had accrued to
him each year. This method of handling his tax problems was denied by
the court hearing his plea.
Because the Income-tax Department has used more than its allotted
space in this month’s issue, no further comment upon the treasury decisions
published will be made, but we urge a careful reading of them, as they
are all instructive.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 608.—October Term, 1920
The Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company, as
trustee of the estate of Arthur Ryerson, In error to the district
deceased, plaintiff in error,
court of the United
vs.
States for the northern
Julius F. Smietanka, formerly United States
district
of Illinois.
collector of internal revenue for the first
district of the state of Illinois.
[March 28, 1921]
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court.
A writ of error brings this case here for review of a judgment of the
district court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois,
sustaining a demurrer to a declaration in assumpsit to recover an assess
ment of taxes for the year 1917, made under warrant of the income-tax
act of congress, approved September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. ch. 463, p. 756)
as amended by the act, approved October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. ch. 63, p. 300).
Payment was made under protest and the claim to recover is based upon
the contention that the fund taxed was not “income” within the scope of
the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and that
the effect given by the lower court to the act of congress cited renders it
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unconstitutional and void. This is sufficient to sustain the writ of error.
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418.
Arthur Ryerson died in 1912, and the plaintiff in error is trustee under
his will, of property the net income of which was directed to be paid to
his widow during her life and after her death to be used for the benefit
of his children, or their representatives, until each child should arrive at
twenty-five years of age, when each should receive his or her share of
the trust fund.
The trustee was given the fullest possible dominion over the trust
estate. It was made the final judge as to what “net income” of the estate
should be, and its determination in this respect was made binding upon all
parties interested therein, “except that it is my will that stock dividends
and accretions of selling values shall be considered principal and not
income.”
The widow and four children were living in 1917.
Among the assets which came to the custody of the trustee were 9,522
shares of the capital stock of Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, a corporation.
It is averred that the cash value of these shares, on March 1, 1913, was
$561,798, and that there were sold for $1,280,996.64, on February 2, 1917.
The commissioner of internal revenue treated the difference between the
value of the stock on March 1, 1913, and the amount for which it was
sold on February 2, 1917, as income for the year 1917, and upon that
amount assessed the tax which was paid. No question is made as to the
amount of the tax if the collection of it was lawful.
The ground of the protest, and the argument for the plaintiff in error
here, is that the sum charged as “income” represented appreciation in the
value of the capital assets of the estate which was not “income” within the
meaning of the sixteenth amendment and therefore could not, constitu
tionally, be taxed, without apportionment, as required by section 2, clause 3,
and by section 9, clause 4, of article I of the constitution of the United
States.
It is first argued that the increase in value of the stock could not be
lawfully taxed under the act of congress because it was not income to
the widow, for she did not receive it in 1917, and never can receive it,
that it was not income in that year to the children for they did not then,
and may never, receive it, and that it was not income to the trustee,
not only because the will creating the trust required that “stock dividends
and accretions of selling value shall be considered principal and not in
come,” but also because in the “common understanding” the term “income”
does not comprehend such a gain or profit as we have here, which it is
contended is really an accretion to capital and therefore not constitutionally
taxable under Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189.
The provision of the will may be disregarded. It was not within the
power of the testator to render the fund non-taxable.
Assuming for the present that there was constitutional power to tax
such a gain or profit as is here involved, are the terms of the statute
comprehensive enough to include it?
Section 2 (a) of the act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 757), (40 Stat.
300, 307, sec. 212), applicable to the case, defines the income of “a tax
able person” as including “gains, profits and income derived from .
sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the
ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property ... or
gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”
Plainly the gain we are considering was derived from the sale of
personal property, and, very certainly the comprehensive last clause “gains
or profits and income derived from any source whatever,” must also in
clude it, if the trustee was a “taxable person” within the meaning of the
act when the assessment was made.
That the trustee was such a “taxable person” is clear from Section 1204
(1) (c) of the Act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. 331), which requires that
“trustees, executors . . . and all persons, corporations or associations,

435

The Journal of Accountancy
acting in any fiduciary capacity, shall make and render a return of the
income of the person, trust, or estate for whom or which they act, and
be subject to all the provisions of this title which apply to individuals.”
And section 2 (b) of the act of September 8, 1916, supra, specifically
declares that the
“income received by estates of deceased persons during the period of
administration or settlement of the estate, ... or any kind of prop
erty held in trust, including such income accumulated in trust for the
benefit of unborn or unascertained persons, or persons with contingent
interests, and income held for future distribution under the terms of the
will or trust shall be likewise taxed, the tax in each instance, except when
the income is returned for the purpose of the tax by the beneficiary, to be
assessed to the executor, administrator, or trustee, as the case may be.”
Further, section 2 (c) clearly shows that it was the purpose of con
gress to tax gains, derived from such a sale as we have here, in the manner
in which this fund was assessed, by providing that
“for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale or other
disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired before March 1,
1913, the fair market price or value of such property as of March 1, 1913,
shall be the basis for determining the amount of such gain derived.”
Thus, it is the plainly expressed purpose of the act of congress to treat
such a trustee as we have here as a “taxable person” and for the purposes
of the act to deal with the income received for others precisely as if the
beneficiaries had received it in person.
There remains the question, strenuously argued, whether this gain in
four years of over $700,000 on an investment of about $500,000 is “income”
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of the
United States.
The question is one of definition and the answer to it may be found in
recent decisions of this Court.
The corporation excise-tax act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 11, 112),
was not an income-tax law, but a definition of the word “income” was so
necessary in its administration that in an early case it was formulated as
“A gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”
(Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415.)
This definition, frequently approved by this court, received an addition,
in its latest income-tax decision, which is especially significant in its
application to such a case as we have here, so that it now reads: “Income
may be defined as a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through sale
or conversion of capital assets.” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207.
The use made of this definition of “income” in the decision of cases
arising under the corporation excise-tax act of August 5, 1909, and under
the income-tax acts is, we think, decisive of the case before us. Thus,
in two cases arising under the corporation excise-tax act:
In Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Company, 247 U. S. 189, a coal com
pany, without corporate authority to trade in stocks, purchased shares in
another coal mining company in 1902, which it sold in 1911, realizing a
profit of $210,000. Over the same objection made in this case, that the
fund was merely converted capital, this court held that so much of the
profit upon the sale of the stock as accrued subsequent to the effective
date of the act was properly treated as income received during 1911, in
assessing the tax for that year.
In United States v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway
Company, 247 U. S. 195, a railroad company purchased shares of stock in
another railroad company in 1900 which it sold in 1909, realizing a profit
of $814,000. Here, again, over the same objection, this court held that the
part of the profit which accrued subsequent to the effective date of the
act was properly treated as income received during the year 1909 for the
purposes of the act.
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Thus, from the price realized from the sale of stock by two investors,
as distinguished from dealers, and from a single transaction as distinguished
from a course of business, the value of the stock on the effective date of
the tax act was deducted and the resulting gain was treated by this court
as “income” by which the tax was measured.
It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the
word “income” has the same meaning in the income-tax act of 1913
that it had in the corporation excise-tax act of 1909, and that it has the
same scope of meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific Company
v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335, where it was assumed for the purposes of
decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of
1909 and in the income-tax act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the
word must be given the same meaning and content in the income-tax acts
of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When to this we add
that in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, a case arising under the same income-tax
act of 1916 which is here involved, the definition of “income” which was
applied was adopted from Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, supra,
arising under the corporation excise-tax act of 1909, with the addition that
it should include “profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets,” there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must
be given the same meaning in all of the income-tax acts of congress that
was given to it in the corporation excise-tax act and that what that
meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this court.
In determining the definition of the word “income” thus arrived at,
this court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of
lexicographers or economists and has approved, in the definitions quoted,
what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term
which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the
sixteenth amendment to the constitution. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Com
pany, 247 U. S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 206, 207.
Notwithstanding the full argument heard in this case and in the series
of cases now under consideration we continue entirely satisfied with that
definition, and, since the fund here taxed was the amount realized from
the sale of the stock in 1917, less the capital investment as determined by
the trustee as of March 1, 1913, it is palpable that it was a “gain or profit”
“produced by” or “derived from” that investment, and that it “proceeded”
and was “severed” or rendered severable, from it, by the sale for cash,
and thereby became that “realized gain” which has been repeatedly declared
to be taxable income within the meaning of the constitutional amendment
and the acts of congress. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company and Eisner
v. Macomber, supra.
It is elaborately argued in this case, in No. 609, Eldorado Coal &
Mining Company v. Harry W. Mager, Collector, etc., submitted with it,
and in other cases since argued, that the word “income” as used in the
sixteenth amendment and in the income-tax act we are considering does
not include the gain from capital realized by a single isolated sale of
property but that only the profits realized from sales by one engaged in
buying and selling as a business—a merchant, a real estate agent, or broker
—constitute income which may be taxed.
It is sufficient to say of this contention, that no such distinction was
recognized in the civil war income-tax act of 1867 (14 Stat. 471, 478),
or in the act of 1894 (28 Stat. 509, 553), declared unconstitutional or an
unrelated ground; that it was not recognized in determining income under
the excise-tax act of 1909, as the cases cited, supra, show; that it is not
to be found, in terms, in any of the income-tax provisions of the internal
revenue acts of 1913, 1916, 1917 or 1919; that the definition of the word
"income” as used in the sixteenth amendment, which has been developed
by this court, does not recognize any such distinction; that in departmental
practice, for now seven years, such a rule has not been applied; and that
there is no essential difference in the nature of the transaction or in the
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relation of the profit to the capital involved, whether the sale or conver
sion be a single, isolated transaction or one of many. The interesting and
ingenious argument, which is earnestly pressed upon us, that this distinction
is so fundamental and obvious that it must be assumed to be a part of
the “general understanding” of the meaning of the word “income” fails
to convince us that a construction should be adopted which would, in a
large measure, defeat the purpose of the amendment.
The opinions of the courts in dealing with the rights of life tenants
and remaindermen in gains derived from invested capital, especially in
dividends paid by corporations, are of little value in determining such a
question as we have here, influenced as such decisions are by the terms of
the instruments creating the trusts involved and by the various rules
adopted in the various jurisdictions for attaining results thought to be
equitable. Here the trustee, acting within its powers, sold the stock,
as it might have sold a building, and realized a profit of $700,000, which
at once became assets in its possession free for any disposition within the
scope of the trust but for the purposes of taxation to be treated as if the
trustee were the sole owner.
Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63, much relied upon in argument, was
sufficiently distinguished from cases such as we have here in Hays v.
Gauley Mountain Coal Company, 247 U. S. 189, 191. The differences in the
statutes involved render inapplicable the expressions in the opinion in that
case (not necessary to the decision of it) as to distinctions between income
and increase of capital.
In Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, also much relied upon, it is ex
pressly stated that, “according to the fact admitted, there was no increase
after that date (March 1, 1913) and therefore no increase subject to the
law.” For this reason the questions here discussed and decided were not
there presented.
The British income-tax decisions are interpretations of statutes so
wholly different in their wording from the acts of congress which we
are considering that they are quite without value in arriving at the con
struction of the laws here involved.
Another assessment on a small gain realized from a sale of bonds,
also made by the trustee in 1917, does not present any questions other
than those which we have discussed and therefore it does not call for
separate consideration.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, because of prior de
cisions of the court, concur only in the judgment.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 609.—October Term, 1920
Eldorado Coal & Mining Company, plaintiff
In error to the district
in error,
court of the United
vs.
States for the northern
Harry W. Mager, collector of internal revenue
district of Illinois.
for the first district of Illinois.

[March 28, 1921]
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes into this court on a writ of error to review a judgment
of the district court of the United States for the northern district of
Illinois, sustaining a demurrer to a declaration in assumpsit to recover an
assessment of income- and excess-profits taxes for the year 1917, under
warrant of the income-tax act of congress, approved September 8, 1916
(39 Stat., ch. 463, p. 756) as amended by the act approved October 3, 1917
(40 Stat., ch. 63, p. 300). Payment was made under protest and the
claim to recover is based upon the same contention dealt with in No. 608,
this day decided, that the fund taxed was not “income” within the scope
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of the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and
that the effect given by the lower court to the act renders it unconstitutional
and void.
The Eldorado Coal & Mining Company is an Indiana corporation, which
operated a bituminous coal mine and mining plant, which it sold in May,
1917, for cash. The company retained its accounts receivable and prior
to September 30, 1917, it distributed among its stockholders, proportionately
to their ownership of stocks, the cash received from the sale and the
accounts receivable in kind. The corporation, however, was not dissolved
nor its charter surrendered, because there were unsettled liabilities against
it for federal income taxes and excess-profits taxes. Otherwise its affairs
were wound up.
It is averred in the declaration that, taking the fair market value as
of March 1, 1913, of the capital assets of the company invested and em
ployed in its business, and adding thereto the cost of additions and better
ments, and subtracting depreciation and depletion to the date of sale, it
appears that there was an appreciation in value of the property after March
1, 1913, of $5,986.02, and it was on this profit realized by the sale that the
assessment of $3,073.16 was made which the company paid and in this suit
seeks to recover.
It is obvious from this statement of the case that it presents in so
nearly the same form precisely the same questions as were considered in
No. 608, The Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company, etc. v. Julius F.
Smietanka, Collector, etc., this day decided, that further discussion of them
is unnecessary, and, on the authority of that case, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, because of prior de
cisions of the court, concur only in the judgment.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 663.—October Term, 1920
David M. Goodrich, plaintiff in error,
In error to the District
vs.
court of the United
William H. Edwards, United States collector
States for the southern
of internal revenue for the second district
district of New York.
of the state of New York.
[March 28, 1921]
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error sued the defendant, a collector of internal revenue,
to recover income taxes assessed in 1920 for the year 1916 and paid under
protest to avoid penalties. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained and
the constitutional validity of a law of the United States is so involved
that the case is properly here by writ of error. Towne v. Eisner, 245
U. S. 418.
Two transactions are involved.
(1) In 1912 the plaintiff in error purchased 1,000 shares of the capital
stock of a mining company for which he paid $500. It is averred that the
stock was worth $695 on March 1, 1913, and that it was sold in March,
1916, for $13,931.22. The tax which the plaintiff in error seeks to recover
was assessed on the difference between the value of the stock on March
1, 1913, and the amount for which it was sold.
(2) The plaintiff in error being the owner of shares of the capital
stock of another corporation, in 1912 exchanged them for stock, in a
reorganized company, of the then value of $291,600. It is averred and
admitted that on March 1, 1913, the value of this stock was $148,635.50,
and that it was sold in 1916 for $269,346.25. Although it is thus apparent
that the stock involved was of less value on March 1, 1913, than when
it was acquired, and that it was ultimately sold at a loss to the owner
nevertheless the collector assessed the tax on the difference between the
value on March 1, 1913, and the amount for which it was sold.
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The plaintiff in error seeks to recover the whole of these two assessments.
The same contention is made with respect to each of these payments as
was made in No. 608, The Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company, as Trustee
v. Julius F. Smietanka, Collector of Internal Revenue, this day decided,
viz., that the amounts realized from the sales of the stocks were in their
inherent nature capital as distinguished from income, being an increment
in value of the securities while owned and held as an investment and
therefore not taxable under the revenue act of 1916 (39 Stat. 756) as
amended in 1917 (40 Stat. 300) or under any constitutional law.
With respect to the first payment. It is plain that this assessment
was on the profit accruing after March 1, 1913, the effective date of the
act, realized to the owner by the sale after deducting his capital invest
ment. The question involved is ruled by No. 608, supra, and the amount
was properly taxed.
As to the second payment. The government confesses error in the
judgment with respect to this assessment. The stock was sold in the
year for which the tax was assessed for $22,253.75 less than its value
when it was acquired, but for $120,710.75 more than its value on March
1, 1913, and the tax was assessed on the latter amount.
The act under which the assessment was made provides that the net
income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits and income derived
from . . . sales or dealings in property, whether real or personal
. . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.
(39 Stat. 757; 40 Stat. 300, 307.)
Section 2 (c) of this same act provides that “for the purpose of ascer
taining the gain derived from a sale or other disposition of property,
real, personal or mixed, acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market
price or value of such property as of March 1, 1913, shall be the basis for
determining the amount of such gain derived.”
And the definition of “income” approved by this court is: “A gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be
understood to include profits gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207.
It is thus very plain that the statute imposes the income tax on the
proceeds of the sale of personal property to the extent only that gains
are derived therefrom by the vendor, and we therefore agree with the
solicitor general that since no gain was realized on this investment by the
plaintiff in error no tax should have been assessed against him.
Section 2 (c) is applicable only where a gain over the original capital
investment has been realized after March 1, 1913, from a sale or other
disposition of property.
It results that the judgment of the district court as to the first assess
ment, as we have described it, is affirmed, that as to the second assessment
it is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceed
ings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed in part. Affirmed in part.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, because of prior de
cisions of the court, concur only in the judgment.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 742.—October Term, 1920.
James J. Walsh, collector of internal revenue, In error to the district
plaintiff in error,
court of the United
vs.
States for the district
Frederick F. Brewster.
of Connecticut.
[March 28, 1921]
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court.
In this case the defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error, a collector
of internal revenue, to recover income taxes for the year 1916, assessed
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in 1918, and which were paid under protest to avoid penalties. The defend
ant answered, the case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts, and
judgment was rendered in favor of the taxpayer, the defendant in error.
The case is properly here by writ of error. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418.
The defendant in error was not a trader or dealer in stocks or bonds,
but occasionally purchased and sold one or the other for the purpose of
changing his investments.
Three transactions are involved.
The first relates to bonds of the International Navigation Company,
purchased in 1909, for $191,000 and sold in 1916 for the same amount.
The market value of these bonds on March 1, 1913, was $151,845, and the
tax in dispute was assessed on the difference between this amount and
the amount for which they were sold in 1916, viz., $39,155.
The trial court held that this apparent gain was capital assets and not
taxable income under the sixteenth amendment to the constitution of the
United States, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant in error
for the amount of the tax which he had paid.
The ground upon which this part of the judgment was justified below
is held to be erroneous in No. 608, Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company,
as Trustee v. Julius F. Smietanka, Collector of Internal Revenue, this day
decided, but, since the owner of the stock did not realize any gain on his
original investment by the sale in 1916, the judgment was right in this
respect, and under authority of the opinion and judgment in No. 663,
Goodrich v. Edwards, Collector, also rendered this day, this part of the
judgment is affirmed.
The second transaction involved the purchase in 1902 and 1903 of bonds
of the International Mercantile Marine Company for $231,300, which were
sold in 1916 for $276,150. This purchase was made through an under
writing agreement such that the purchaser did not receive any interest
upon the amount paid prior to the allotment to him of the bonds in 1906,
and he claimed that interest upon the investment for the time which so
elapsed should be added as a part of the cost to him of the bonds. But
this claim was properly rejected by the trial court under authority of
Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Company, 247 U. S. 189.
It is stipulated that the market value of these bonds on March 1, 1913,
was $164,480, and the collector assessed the tax upon the difference between
the selling price and this amount, but since the gain to the taxpayer was
only the difference between his investment of $231,300 and the amount
realized by the sale, $276,150, under authority of No. 663, Goodrich v.
Edwards, Collector, this day decided, he was taxable only on $44,850.
The district court, however, held that any gain realized by the sale
was a mere conversion of capital assets and was not income which could
lawfully be taxed. In this respect the court fell into error. The tax
was properly assessed, but only upon the difference between the purchase
and selling price of the bonds as stated.
The third transaction related to stock in the Standard Oil Company
of California, received through the same stock dividend involved in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189. The district court, upon authority of that
case, properly held that the assessment made and collected upon this
dividend should be refunded to the defendant in error.
It results that as to the profit realized upon the second transaction,
as indicated in this opinion, the judgment of the District Court is reversed,
but as to the other transactions it is affirmed for the reasons and upon the
grounds herein stated. Judgment reversed in part, affirmed in part, and
case remanded.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, because of prior de
cisions of the court, concur only in the judgment.
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TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3153—April 9, 1921)
Income tax—Gross income—Invested capital.
Articles 549 and 870, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition), amended.
Articles 549 and 870, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) are hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 549. Exclusions from gross income.—A life insurance shall not
include in gross income such portion of any actual premium received from
any individual policyholder as is paid back, or credited to, or treated as an
abatement of premium of such policyholder within the taxable year.
“Paid back” means paid in cash.
“Credited to” means applied by way of credit so as to reduce the pre
mium received on the policy for the taxable year. It includes dividends
applied (a) directly to the payment of the premium for the taxable year;
(b) to purchase additional paid-up insurance or annuities; or (c) to shorten
the endowment or premium paying period; or (d) left with the company to
accumulate at interest. It does not include the amount of divisible surplus
annually ascertained and apportioned to deferred dividend policies.
“Treated as an abatement of premium” means of the premium for the
taxable year.
Where the dividend paid back or credited to a policyholder is in excess
of the premium received from such policyholder within the taxable year
there may be excluded from gross income only the amount of the premium
received, and where no premium is received from the policyholder within
the taxable year the company is not entitled to exclude from its premiums
received from other policyholders any amount on account of such divi
dend payment.
Art. 870. Insurance companies.—The reserve funds of life insurance
companies, the net additions to which are deductible from gross income
under the provisions of section 234 of the statute, can not be included in
computing invested capital. The like reserve funds of insurance com
panies, other than life insurance companies, may be included in computing
invested capital. See sections 325 and 326 (a) (3) and (b) and articles
569 and 814.
(T. D. 3154—April 11, 1921)
Action on claims for credit.
Regulations No. 45 (1920 ed.) amended.
Article 1035 of regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Art. 1035. Action on claims for credit.—Upon receipt by the collector
of a claim for credit on form 47 A, he will take no action thereon until
the following requirements have been met:
(a) The collector must ascertain from the commissioner whether a
claim for refund for the year or years upon which the claim for credit
is based, and upon substantially the same ground, has been filed. If no such
claim for refund has been filed, the collector may, on notice thereof from
the commissioner, accept for filing the taxpayer’s claim for credit.
(b) When it is known to the collector that a refund claim of the nature
referred to above is on file with the commissioner, and has not been
adjusted, he will not accept the taxpayer’s claim for credit for the same
year or years until the taxpayer has requested the commissioner to reject
such claim and has been advised by the commissioner that such claim
has been rejected. Claims for refund may not be converted into claims
for credit, except in the manner above mentioned.
Upon acceptance for filing of a claim for credit on form 47 A, the
collector shall certify thereon the required information concerning all out
standing assessments and payments covered thereby and shall note on

442

Income-tax Department
his records that a claim for credit has been filed. He shall thereupon
transmit the claim to the commissioner. Due notice will be given the
collector and the taxpayer of the action taken on the claim. A schedule of
credit claims on form 7220 A will be transmitted to the collector once a
month and formal credit shall be taken by the collector at that time. If a
claim is allowed against additional taxes due for other years, but such
other taxes have not yet been assessed, only the amount of the excess of
such taxes over the overpayment shall be assessed, or the excess of the
overpayment over such taxes due shall be refunded as the case may be.
The effective date of the filing of a claim for credit shall be the actual
date of presentation to the collector. The filing of a claim for credit
against the tax due under another return shall be subject to the same rules
with respect to the addition of interest and penalties as if the taxpayer
had filed a claim for abatement of the tax against which credit is desired.
See articles 1003 and 1006.
Under no circumstances will a taxpayer be permitted to take credit for
an alleged refund due for a prior year on any return filed for a subsequent
year without filing a formal claim for credit on form 47 A, under the
requirements as provided herein. An attempt to take a credit contrary
to the instructions herein set forth shall not be held to be the filing of a
claim under section 252 of the revenue act of 1918.
(T. D. 3155—April 11, 1921)
Income tax—Nonresident aliens.
Articles 312, 313, 314 and 315, regulations No. 45, amended.
Articles 312, 313, 314 and 315 of regulations No. 45 are hereby amended,
to conform with an opinion of the attorney general of March 1, 1921,
to read as follows:
Art. 312. Who is a nonresident alien individual?—A “nonresident alien
individual” means an individual (a) whose residence is not within the
United States and (b) who is not a citizen of the United States. An
alien actually present in the United States who is not a mere transient or
sojourner is a resident of the United States for purposes of the income
tax. Whether he is a transient or not is determined by his intentions
with regard to his stay and the length and nature of his stay. A mere
floating intention, indefinite as to time, to return to another country is not
sufficient to constitute him a transient. If he lives in the United States
and has no definite intention as to his stay, he is a resident. One who
comes to the United States for a definite purpose which in its nature may
be promptly accomplished is a transient; but if his purpose is of such a
nature that an extended stay may be necessary for its accomplishment,
and to that end the alien makes his home temporarily in the United States,
he becomes a resident, though it may be his intention at all times to return
to his domicile abroad when the purpose for which he came has been
consummated or abandoned.
Art. 313. Proof of residence of alien.—The following rules of evidence
shall govern in determining whether or not an alien within the United
States has acquired residence therein within the meaning of the revenue
act. An alien, by reason of his alienage, is presumed to be a nonresident
alien. Such presumption may be overthrown (1) in the case of an alien
who presents himself for determination of tax liability prior to departure
for his native country, by (a) proof that the alien, at least six months
prior to the date he so presents himself, has filed a declaration of his
intention to become a citizen of the United States under the naturalization
laws, (b) proof that the alien, at least six months prior to the date he so
presents himself, has filed form 1078 (revised) or its equivalent, or
(c) proof of acts and statements of the alien showing a definite intention
to acquire residence in the United States or showing that his stay in the
United States had been of such an extended nature as to constitute him a
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resident; (2) in all other cases by (a) proof that the alien has filed a
declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States under
the naturalization laws, (b) proof that the alien has filed form 1078 (re
vised) or its equivalent, or (c) proof of acts and statements of an alien
showing a definite intention to acquire residence in the United States or
showing that his stay in the United States has been of such an extended
nature as to constitute him a resident. In any case in which an alien seeks
to overcome the presumption of nonresidence under (1) (c) or (2) (c)
above, if the officer who examines the alien is in doubt as to the facts, such
officer may, to assist him in determining the facts, require an affidavit or
affidavits setting forth the facts relied upon, executed by some creditable
person or persons, other than the alien and members of his family, who
have known the alien at least six months prior to the date of execution of
the affidavit or affidavits.
Art. 314. Loss of residence by alien.—An alien who has acquired resi
dence in the United States retains his status as a resident until he abandons
the same and actually departs from the United States. An intention to
change his residence does not change his status as a resident alien to that
of a nonresident alien. Thus an alien who has acquired a residence in
the United States is taxable as a resident for the remainder of his stay
in the United States. The status of an alien on the last day of his taxable
year or period determines his liability to tax for such year or period as a
resident or nonresident. See articles 305 and 306.
Art. 315. Duty of employer to determine status of alien employee.—If
wages are paid to aliens without withholding the tax, except as permitted
in article 316, the employer should be prepared to prove the status of the
alien as provided in the foregoing articles. An employer may rely upon
the evidence of residence afforded by the fact that an alien has filed form
1078 (revised) or an equivalent certificate of the alien establishing resi
dence. An employer who seeks to account for failure to withhold in the
past, if he had not at the time secured form 1078 (revised) or its equiva
lent, is permitted to prove the former status of the alien by any material
evidence.
(T. D. 3156—April 11, 1921)
Capital-stock tax.
Amendment of T. D. 2800 of March 12, 1919, concerning liability to capital
stock tax of railroad corporations whose properties were held and oper
ated by the federal government under the army appropriation act
approved August 29, 1916.
T. D. 2800 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Under section 407 of the act of September 8, 1916, every domestic
corporation was required to pay annually a special excise tax with respect
to the carrying on or doing business equivalent to 50 cents for each $1,000
of the fair value of its capital stock. The act approved February 24, 1919,
increased the tax to $1 for each $1,000 of the fair average value of the
capital stock and reduced the exemption from $99,000 to $5,000. Questions
have been raised as to the liability to the capital-stock tax of corporations
owning railroads controlled and operated by the federal government.
Liability to capital-stock tax is made to depend upon whether a cor
poration is “carrying on or doing business” within the meaning of the
taxing act. A corporation which has been organized or chartered to oper
ate a railroad property but which has ceased to operate it by reason of the
fact that the property is being operated by the federal government is not
liable to capital-stock tax unless it is carrying on or doing business in con
nection with other property than its railroad property. The renting of
property which was acquired by the corporation as an incident to its rail
road business but which was not needed by the federal government is not
such carrying on or doing of business as would involve the corporation in
liability to capital-stock tax.
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(T. D. 3159—April 29, 1921)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Year to Which Income Apportionable—Lump Sum Awarded to
Receiver in Addition to Salary.
Where a receiver of a railroad was, in 1918, awarded a large sum in
addition to his regular salary, as additional compensation, which he was
required to return on a cash receipts and disbursements basis as income for
the year 1918, he was properly refused permission to report the income
on an accrual basis, apportioning it over the five years of the receivership,
for the reasons (1) that the taxpayer had no right to make his return on
an accrual basis under section 212 of the revenue act of 1918, and (2) the
award was compensation for personal services which was income of the
calendar year of its determination and payment.
2. Effect of Nunc Pro Tunc Order Apportioning Over Period of Years
Additional Compensation Previously Awarded Receiver.
Where, upon demand by collector that he return award as income of
1918, taxpayer applied to court for a nunc pro tunc order showing that the
additional compensation was earned and accrued in equal monthly in
stallments throughout the receivership, which order was entered, such order
was ineffective to alter the conclusion that the award was income for the
year in which determined and paid.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals
for the seventh circuit, in the case of Jackson v. Smietanka, Collector,
is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned:

United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
No. 2794. October Term, 1920, January Session, 1921.
William J. Jackson, plaintiff in error, v. Julius F. Smietanka, collector of
internal revenue, defendant in error.
[Error to the district court of the United States for the northern district
of Illinois, eastern division.]
Before Baker, Alschuler and Evans, circuit judges.
Baker, circuit judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
Jackson, plaintiff, filed a declaration to recover income taxes paid by
him under protest. Defendant’s demurrer was sustained; plaintiff declined
to plead over; and this writ of error challenges the consequent judgment.
From May, 1913, to April, 1918, plaintiff served as a railroad receiver
under appointment of the district court at Chicago. Plaintiff accepted the
employment under an order providing that he “be paid on account of his
services at the rate of $2,000 per month,” and that on termination of his
trust he “shall be at liberty to apply for such further compensation as to
the court may then appear reasonable and just.” For the years 1913 to
1917, inclusive, plaintiff made returns on the basis of “income received;”
and, respecting this receivership, he had neither a business system nor books
nor unpaid allowances for service from which he could have made returns
of “income accrued.” In 1918 plaintiff was allowed and paid “as final
payment for all services rendered by him during the receivership herein
the additional sum of $100,000.” On March 14, 1919, plaintiff filed his
return for 1918, showing the receipt of said $100,000, and also filed amended
returns for 1913 to 1917, inclusive, in which he claimed that pro rata parts
of said $100,000 were “accrued income” of those years. On April 16, 1919,
the collector rejected the amended returns and demanded normal taxes
and surtaxes on the $100,000 so received in 1918. Plaintiff then prepared
and on April 22, 1919, presented to the district court a petition for a nunc
pro tunc order showing that the additional compensation was earned and
had accrued in equal monthly installments throughout the receivership,
and the order as tendered was entered. Thereupon plaintiff, on May 28,
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1919, paid $26,826 under protest, and subsequently brought this action to
recover the difference, $19,973.
Unless some effect is to be given to the nunc pro tunc order, the
collector was right. Section 213 of the revenue act of 1918 requires a
return of “income derived from salaries or compensation for personal
service” and provides that the amount thereof “shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer unless
under methods of account permitted under subdivision (b) of section 212
any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period.”
That subdivision permits a return “upon the basis of the taxpayer’s annual
account period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping
the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been
so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the
income, the computation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner
as in the opinion of the commissioner does clearly reflect the income.”
Not only do the facts of this case demonstrate that there is no permission
in that subdivision to save plaintiff from the direct mandate of section 213,
but article 32 of regulations No. 45 (authorized by section 1309 of the act)
explicitly requires that “where no determination of compensation for per
sonal services is had until the completion of the services, the amount received
is income for the calendar year of its determination.” Plaintiff from time
to time during the receivership had applied to the court for additional
compensation, and the court had always refused. Manifestly such refusals
were in accordance with the original order of appointment, which plainly
denied any intermediate right to additional compensation and left the
question of what additional compensation, if any, would be fair to be deter
mined when the trust ended and to be dependent upon the outcome of the
administration. And whether the regulation means that the compensation
is income of the year in which the determination of the amount is made,
or is income of the year in which payment is made, is immaterial in the
present case, for both determination of amount and payment thereof oc
curred in 1918.
A year after plaintiff had finally stepped out of the district court and
a month after his liability to make a true return of his income for 1918
had become fixed, plaintiff reappeared in court and obtained the aforesaid
nunc pro tunc order. Respecting the general question of a court’s authority
to make nunc pro tunc orders or judgments, plaintiff cites certain authori
ties, which we supplement by calling attention to others. In regard to
the present order it suffices to say: There was no misprision of a clerical
officer; no new facts; no newly discovered evidence concerning former
issues of fact; no failure in the court to enter the original order exactly
as the court intended to enter it; even if the petition for the nunc pro tunc
order had tendered an issue which interested the original parties (the
railroad company and its creditors), no steps were taken by the aforetime
receiver to have them join issue; the petition was heard ex parte; and as
to the government all the matters in the district court were res inter alios.
The judgment is affirmed.
(T. D. 3160—April 28, 1921)
Capital-stock tax—Act of September 8, 1916, Title IV—Decision of court.
1. Validity of Tax.
The capital-stock tax is an excise tax imposed upon a corporation with
respect to the carrying on or doing business by the corporation, which is a
proper subject for taxation by the government, and within its constitutional
powers of taxation.
2. Payment in Advance.
The capital-stock tax imposed by the act of September 8, 1916, is not
illegal because assessed and collected in advance under regulations of the
treasury department; the act, by sections 407 and 409, contemplating that
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a corporation must pay a tax on its capital stock for the preceding year
in order to do business for the coming year.
3. Action to Recover Tax Paid—Maintenance.
An action to recover a capital-stock tax paid in advance, on the ground
that advance payment was unauthorized, can not be maintained where the
tax became due and payable under the taxpayer’s theory before suit was
brought.
The appended decision of the court of claims, under date of February
14, 1921, in the case of the Washington Water Power Co., a corporation,
v. United States, is published for the information of internal-revenue offi
cers and others concerned:

Court of Claims of the United States. No. 34092.
The Washington Water Power Co., a corporation, v. United States.
[Decided Feb. 14, 1921]
This case having been heard by the court of claims, the court, upon
the evidence makes the following
Findings of Fact.
I. The plaintiff, The Washington Water Power Co., is and was during
the period hereinafter stated, a corporation organized for profit and engaged
in business in the state of Washington.
II. On or about January 31, 1917, the plaintiff duly filed a return on
form 707 prescribed by the treasury department for the return of the tax
on corporations under section 407, title IV, act of September 8, 1916
(30 Stat., 756). In his return plaintiff stated the value and amount of its
capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits for the year ending June 30,
1916, and computed the amount of tax due thereon for the six months
ending June 30, 1917, at the rate of 25 cents for each $1,000 of such value
to be the sum of $2,977.75. This return was accompanied by the following
written statement:
The Washington Water Power Co. hereby formally protests against the
filing of this return, and only does so under compulsion exerted by the
collector of internal revenue. In support of its protest the company states
that no return is due from it to the United States at this time under the
act commonly known as the capital-stock tax law, being embraced in
title IV of the act approved September 8, 1916, and that the demand of the
collector of internal revenue for the filing of such return is illegal and
unauthorized.
III. On or about March 9, 1917, the plaintiff paid to the United States
collector of internal revenue for the district of Washington, in said state,
the sum of $2,977.75, as a tax under said statute for the six months’ period
ending June 30, 1917. This tax was paid voluntarily and without protest.
IV. On or about July 25, 1917, plaintiff filed another return similar in
form to that described in finding II, computing thereon the amount of tax
due for the year ending June 30, 1918, to be the sum of $5,458.50. This
return was also accompanied by a written statement identical with that
set forth in finding II.
V. On or about September 24, 1917, the plaintiff paid the United States
collector for said district in the sum of $5,458.50 as a tax under said
statute for the year ending June 30, 1918, which was computed at the rate
of 50 cents for each $1,000 of plaintiff’s capital stock, surplus, and undi
vided profits less authorized deduction.
The payment of this tax was accompanied by the following written
protest:
The Washington Water Power Company hereby protests against the
payment of taxes in the amount of $5,458.50, or in any other amount, which
are alleged to be due by the collector of internal revenue under the terms
of the act commonly known as the capital-stock tax law, being embraced in
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title IV of the act of congress approved September 8, 1916. That this
payment is made by this company involuntarily, under duress and com
pulsion, and in order to avoid penalties and the institution of distraint
proceedings, which it is advised by the collector of internal revenue will
be exacted and instituted unless payment is now made. Further, in support
of its protest the Washington Water Power Company states that no tax is
now lawfully due by said company to the United States under the terms
of the capital-stock tax law, as aforesaid. Said company hereby notifies the
collector of internal revenue of its intention to recover said taxes illegally
collected by appropriate proceedings in the courts.
VI. On or about October 31, 1917, the plaintiff filed in the treasury de
partment an application demanding a refund to it of the sum of $2,977.75,
and also the sum of $5,458.50, being the amount of the taxes which it had
paid as set forth in findings III and V. The said claim for refund was
rejected by the commissioner of internal revenue on or about June 14, 1918.
VII. The petition to recover in this case was filed on February 26, 1919.
Conclusion of Law.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides, as a conclusion
of law, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and its petition is
therefore dismissed.
Judgment is rendered against the plaintiff for the cost of printing the
record in this cause, the amount thereof to be entered by the chief clerk
and collected by him according to law.
Graham, judge, delivered the opinion of the court:
In this suit the plaintiff seeks to have refunded taxes collected from it
under section 407, title IV, act of September 8, 1916, which provides
as follows:
Every corporation * * * shall pay annually a special excise tax
with respect to carrying on or doing business by such corporation * * *.
The act, by its terms, provides for “a special excise tax” on corporations
which had been doing business during the previous year of $0.50 per $1,000
on the value of the capital stock, this value to include surplus and un
divided profits, the tax to be computed on the basis of the fair average
value of the capital stock for the preceding year.
It is further provided in the said act as follows:
Sec. 409. That all administrative or special provisions of law, including
the law relating to the assessment of taxes, so far as applicable, are hereby
extended to and made a part of this title, and every person, firm, company,
corporation, or association liable to any tax imposed by this title shall keep
such records and render, under oath, such statements and returns as shall
comply with such regulations as the commissioner of internal revenue, with
the approval of the secretary of the treasury, may from time to time
prescribe.
The amount of such annual tax shall in all cases be computed on the
basis of the fair average value of the capital stock for the preceding year:
* * * and, provided, further, that this tax shall not be imposed upon
any corporation * * * not engaged in business during the preceding
taxable year.
Any person who carries on any business or occupation for which special
taxes are imposed by this title, without having paid the special tax thereon
provided, shall, besides being liable to the payment of such special tax,
be deemed guilty of a misdemeaner * * *—
and goes on to provide a penalty.
Thus it appears that all administrative or special provisions, including
the law relating to the assessment of taxes, are made applicable to its en
forcement. The act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat., 624, which deals with
the collection of special taxes, provides for the payment of these taxes
in advance.
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On October 19, 1916, the commissioner of internal revenue, with the
approval of the secretary of the treasury, as authorized by law, promul
gated regulations which adopted, as a basis of payment, the provisions of
the said act of October 1, 1890, requiring payment in advance. These
regulations contained the following:
1. Time of filing returns.—The capital-stock tax, which becomes effective
January 1, 1917, will be payable in January, 1917, on returns to be made
during that month for the six months ending June 30, 1917. In July,
1917, and annually thereafter, returns must again be made and the tax
paid for the ensuing fiscal year.
On January 30, 1917, the plaintiff made a return for the six months
ending June 30, 1917, showing that it was liable for the payment of
$2,977.75, and attached thereto a written protest against making the
return. The plaintiff paid the sum above shown by its return to the
collector of internal revenue, the tax being upon the basis of this return,
without protest. On the 25th of July, 1917, the plaintiff made another
return in the sum of $5,458.50, to which was attached a protest, and on
the 13th day of September, 1917, paid this sum to the collector of internal
revenue, attaching a protest against payment.
On October 28, 1917, the plaintiff filed with the treasury department
an application for the refund of the aforesaid sums of money, which
application was, on June 14, 1918, rejected and denied by the collector
of internal revenue. The moneys have never been refunded. This suit
was filed February 26, 1919, for the recovery of these two sums so paid.
From the above quotations from the act it will be seen that the tax is
spoken of in the act as “a special excise tax with respect to carrying on
or doing business,” so that there can be no question that congress intended
it to be what it called it, namely, “a special excise tax.” The capital
stock of the plaintiff corporation was a proper subject for taxation by the
government, and within its constitutional powers of taxation, and the
tax was due after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the
said regulations by the treasury department. The presumption will be in
favor of the legality of the act and that congress performed its duties,
with the burden upon the plaintiff to show that the taxes it seeks to recover
were not due—Arthur v. Unkart (96 U. S., 118) ; Union Trust Co. of
Indianapolis v. United States (55 Ct. Cls.), and this the petitioner has
failed to do.
The contention is that the tax was illegal because it was assessed and
collected in advance under the regulations of the treasury department.
The matter might be disposed of without further comment on the familiar
principle that a suit can not be maintained to recover taxes once paid,
and which were, in fact, due, because the manner of collecting the tax
was not authorized.—Schafer v. Craft (144 Fed., 407); Anderson v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (241 Fed., 322-329).
However, without regard to the question of advance payment, if these
taxes were due, when collected, and had not been paid in advance, they
would have been due and payable, the first installment on July 1, 1917, and
the last installment on July 1, 1918; so that, at the time this suit was
brought, on February 26, 1919, these taxes would have been due and
payable over seven months, and consequently, the money for their pay
ment was properly in the hands of the treasury department. If these
taxes being due had not been paid, they would still be due and payable.
Thus, this seems to be an effort to compel the treasury to take the money
out of one hand and pass it into the other, without any benefit accruing
to the petitioner.
It may be well to point out that, as appears from the foregoing quota
tions from it, the act itself contemplated the payment of this tax as a
tax upon the right to the “carrying on or doing business,” computed on
the basis of the “fair average value of the capital stock for the preceding
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year”—that is, a corporation must pay a tax on its capital stock for the
preceding year in order to do business for the coming year.
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the interpretation of the
act by the commissioner of internal revenue, with the approval of the
secretary of the treasury, providing for payments in advance, was right
If another interpretation might have been put upon the act, it would have
to be shown that the interpretation was clearly erroneous.—Moore’s case
(95 U. S., 760) ; Tanner v. United States (25 Ct. Cls., 68). This does
not appear.
The petition is dismissed, and it is so ordered.
Hay, judge; Downey, judge; Booth, judge; and Campbell, chief
justice, concur.

Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants
At the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified
Public Accountants the following officers and directors were elected:
President, Horace P. Griffith; vice-president, D. Vincent Johnson;
secretary, Robert J. Bennett; treasurer, Charles S. Rockey. The fol
lowing directors were elected for a term of two years: William J.
Wilson, George Wilkinson, Joseph M. Pugh. The following directors
were elected a year ago and their terms expire in 1922: James J.
Burns, John R. Lynn.
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants
At the annual meeting of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants held May 9, 1921, the following officers were
elected for the ensuing year: Howard B. Cook, president; Robert
H. Montgomery, first vice-president; Willis S. Whittlesey, second vicepresident; James F. Farrell, secretary; James F. Hughes, treasurer.

Gray, Scheiber & Co. announce the removal of their offices to
Guaranty Trust building, Fifth avenue and 44th street, New York.

Ernst & Ernst announce the removal of their Fort Worth office to
Farmers and Mechanics’ National Bank building.

Oscar Moss announces the opening of an office at 227 H. W. Hell
man building, Los Angeles, California.

J. C. Baker & Co. announce the removal of their offices to 5 North
La Salle street, Chicago.
Gustave A. Wuerfel announces the removal of his offices to 220
Broadway, New York.
F. A. Morrison & Co. announce the removal of their offices to 76
William street, New York.

Nathaniel Pomerance announces the removal of his office to 320
Broadway, New York.
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